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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of our nation, democratic ideals have governed our jury system. l 
The right of a criminal defendant to a trial by jury is one of our most cherished and 
protected rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.2 Ideally, a jury drawn from the 
community will provide the most impartial and fair decision possible.s Thus, the jury's 
power lies in the capacity of individuals with diverse viewpoints to reach a verdict that 
will reflect the community conscience.4 The selection system should thus ensure that a 
fair and impartial jury is impaneled and that bias is minimized. 5 
However, racial discrimination has long pervaded the jury selection process.6 Even 
in modern times, jury discrimination still taints our system. Lately, the racially discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges by the defense has gained a great deal of attention. 
The issue was recently raised in the highly publicized and racially volatile Howard Beach 
case where the defense used their peremptory challenges to eliminate blacks from the 
jury since the victim was black and the defendants were white.' The prosecution claimed 
that the defense wrongfully used their peremptories to systematically exclude blacks.s 
The trial judge ruled that the defense lawyers were seeking to exclude blacks from the 
1 Most of the colonies specifically guaranteed trial by jury in their charters. See generally J. VAN 
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES- OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS, at 
6-9 for a historical discussion of the American jury. 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI., see infra note 13. 
, See VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at xiv. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
6 See e.g., Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (State statute which in effect prohibited black 
persons from serving on juries was found to be unconstitutional.). See infra note 37 and accom-
panying text. 
7 The victim, who was black, was struck and killed by a car after four white youths beat him 
with sticks and then proceeded to chase him on to a busy parkway. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at 
B3, col. 5-6. 
8 [d. at col. 5. 
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jury and that he would curb the lawyers' remaining challenges against prospective black 
jurors.9 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the use of peremptory challenges by the 
defense in criminal cases. However, the Court recently has ruled that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids prosecutors from using their peremptory challenges to exclude black 
jurors solely on account of their race, or on the assumption that black jurors as a group 
will be unable to impartially consider the case against blacks. 10 The Court did not extend 
the ruling to cover the defendant's use of peremptory challenges. ll However, some state 
courts and lower federal courts have addressed this issue. 12 
This Note first reviews the jury selection procedure and the development of jury 
discrimination cases under the Equal Protection Clause by the Supreme Court. It then 
reviews how state courts and some federal circuits have progressed with regard to the 
issue of discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges using the impartial jury guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment. Using th~ principles set forth in this line of cases, the Note 
then analyzes the use of peremptory challenges by the defense. Finally, the future of 
peremptory challenges in light of recent cases will be discussed. 
II. THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS 
Trial by an impartial jury is one of the basic fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment to every American citizen accused of a crime.13 This right has long 
been a part of our society and stems from English origins. 14 
9 N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at AI, col. 1. 
In his ruling, Justice Thomas A. Demakos declared that "from the totality of the circumstances 
of the case, including the observations made by the court," he had determined that "a prima facie 
case has been made out" that the defense lawyers were "using their peremtory challenges to strike 
jurors on the ground of group bias alone." He said he was extending the Supreme Court ruling 
which prohibits prosecutors from doing that. Furthermore, he cited the California case, People v. 
Wheeler (see infra notes 77-91 & 120-122 and accompanying text), which prohibits both parties 
from systematically excluding blacks through the use of peremptory challenges. [d. at B4, col. 1. 
If there were any further allegations that they were exercising their peremptory challenges 
against blacks on the ground of group bias alone, the judge said he would order the defense lawyers 
to give non-racial explanations. If he found the explanations unacceptable, the challenges would 
be disallowed. [d. at B4, col. 1-2. 
Subsequently, the New York State Appeals Court let the ruling stand, stating that it was not 
the proper time for an Appeals Court to review such an action. Rather, the proper time would be 
during a normal appeal. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1987, at B6, col. 6. 
The final panel of jurors was com posed of six non-Hispanic whites, one black, two people from 
Puerto Rican background, two Asian-Americans, and a man from Guyana whose roots go back to 
Asia. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at B2, col. 1. 
to Batson v. Ky., 476 u.S. 79 (1986). 
II [d. at 89 n.12. 
12 See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 
907 n.29 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489 n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35, 
cert. denied 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481,487 (Fla. 1984); Booker v. Jabe, 775 
F.2d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Mich. v. Booker, -U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 3289 
(1986), afl'd on rehearing, 801 F.2d 871 (1986), cert. denied sub nom. Mich. v. Booker, _U.S. _, 107 
S.Ct. 910 (1987). 
" The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed .... " U.S. CONST. amend.VI. 
14 See VAN DYKE supra note 1, at 2. 
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The primary purpose of the jury is to provide the defendant with the "fairest 
instrument of justice."15 Assembling a group of twelve ordinary people for the sole 
purpose of deciding a given case ideally provides the best means of objectivity. 16 More-
over, community participation in the decision making process promotes public confidence 
in and acceptance of the judicial system by reflecting the collective conscience of the 
community. I' 
While each juror inevitably brings his or her own personal experiences and biases 
into the courtroom, the jury system strives for the impartiality guaranteed by the Con-
stitution by balancing the diversity of viewpoints. IS The jury's power is thus based upon 
a common decision reached along a spectrum of perceptions. 
The jury selection process strives to attain these ideals. The first stage of selection 
involves the compilation of a list of prospective jurors from voter registration lists.19 
Random selection from the whole community is designed to produce a complete list 
most likely to impanel a representative jury.20 Moreover, in an effort to further ensure 
jury independence and impartiality, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act 
in 1968 which outlawed special requirements for federal jurors and ordered random 
selection.21 The purpose of the Act is to provide improved judicial machinery without 
discrimination on federal grand and petit juries and to assure all litigants that potential 
jurors will be selected at random from a representative cross-section of the community.22 
It is also designed to insure that all qualified citizens will have the opportunity to be 
considered for jury service.23 
In the second stage of selection, the number within the jury pool is reduced through 
the use of excuses. Excuses may be granted on different criteria: disqualification, auto-
matic exemption, and discretionary uses24 and at three different times: when selected to 
the list, when summoned for jury duty, and when called at triaL25 
The third stage of the selection process, which will be focused on in this Note, 
involves challenges. The purpose of challenges is to eliminate jurors who may be biased 
in any way about the defendant, the prosecution, or the case and who might threaten 
the jury's impartiality.26 After questioning, each competing attorney can eliminate pro-
spective jurors in two ways: using challenges for cause or exercising peremptory chal-
lenges during voir dire. Challenges for cause are based on "narrowly, specified, provable 
and legally cognizable basis of partiality."2' For example, the court will accept challenges 
15 [d. at xii. 
16 [d. 
I7 See id. at xiii. 
18 [d. at xii-xiv. 
19 [d. at 85-86. When necessary, supplemental lists may be used. 28 U.S.C.§ 1863(b)(2) (West 
Supp. 1987); See generally VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 98-104. 
20 V AN DYKE supra note 1, at 98-104. 
21 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69 (West Supp. 1987). Section 1862 emphatically states that "No citizen 
shall be excluded from serving as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States 
... on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 
22 H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1792 (1968). 
23 [d. 
24 VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at Ill. 
25 [d. 
26 [d. at 139. 
27 [d. 
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for cause where the juror is related to a party involved, if the juror has a unique interest 
in the subject matter, or if the juror has a "state of mind" which will prejudice him.2S 
Peremptory challenges are made without having to give reason, "without inquiry 
and without subject to the court's control."29 Thus attorneys can remove a limited number 
of prospective jurors30 who they believe are biased without having to defend their 
reasoning.31 Ideally, the purpose ofthe peremptory challenge is to eliminate the extremes 
of partiality on both sides and assure that the case will be decided fairly without regard 
to underlying prejudices.32 Peremptory challenges were instituted to eliminate extreme 
bias among prospective jurors which attorneys could most likely not prove but merely 
had "hunches" about. 33 
In practice, peremptory challenges are inevitably used by attorneys to try to eliminate 
those jurors whom they believe unsympathetic to their cause, or sympathetic to the 
opposing party. For example, a prosecutor might excuse a juror because he or she has 
been in trouble with the police or seems to have bad feelings toward the courts.34 
However, peremptory challenges are not always used in the way in which they were 
intended.35 The abuse of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner has 
been a widely used practice in criminal cases for many years. Prosecutors typically attempt 
to eliminate minority jurors in cases involving minority defendants. This practice tends 
to produce juries predominately composed of white, middle-aged, and middle-class 
people on the assumption that such jurors will identify with the government rather than 
the defendant, thereby increasing the likelihood of conviction.36 Such abuse of peremp-
tory challenges can turn what was once a representative jury into a non-representative 
and possibly biased one. This practice violates the defendant's right to an impartial jury 
under the Constitution. 
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION 
Racial discrimination in the jury selection process has long been recognized as a 
problem in the American judicial system. In 1880, the Supreme Court first addressed 
28 [d. at 143. 
29 [d. at 139-40 (citing Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965». 
lIO FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). "If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled 
to 20 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than 
one year, the government"is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants 
jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory challenges. If there is 
more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges 
and permit tham to be exercised separately or jointly." 
51 VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 140. 
5. See Swain v. Ala., 380 U.S. at 219. 
55 V AN DYKE, supra note 1, at 146. 
M See generally 2 THE PROSECUTOR'S SOURCEBOOK 546 (1969). 
55 In 1973, a Dallas County District Attorney's Office training manual gave this "advice" to 
their prosecutors in selecting jurors: 
1. You are not looking for a fair juror, but rather a strong, biased and sometimes 
hypocritical individual who believes that Defendants are different from them in kind, 
rather than degree. 
2. You are not looking for any member of a minority group which may subject him 
to oppression- they almost always empathize with the accused. 
3. You are not looking for the free thinkers and flower children. 
Id. at 152-53. 
56 [d. at 152. 
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the issue in the landmark case of Strauder v. West Virginia, in which the Court struck 
down a state statute that denied black citizens the right to serve on juries. 37 The exclusion 
of black people from jury panels on the basis of their race was held to be a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The Court reiterated that 
the importance of the jury lies in the fact that it is a representative body composed of 
peers and equals.39 Moreover, the court went on to acknowledge that the existence of 
prejudice in the jury selection was the type of discrimination the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to eradicate upon the emancipation of blacks from slavery.4o 
With the Strauder decision, the Supreme Court set the first precedent in the long 
struggle against racial discrimination in jury selection. Only one year later, the Court in 
Neal v. Delaware found that the conduct of state administrative officers could constitute 
evidence of discriminatory purpose where the law itself was neutral on its face,4l The 
Court thus found discriminatory state action where state officers had purposefully ex-
cluded blacks in composing jury lists.42 
Following Neal v. Delaware, the Court consistently found constitutional violations 
where blacks were denied their full rights to jury selection.43 Thus, constitutional viola-
tions were found not only where blacks were totally excluded from the jury,44 but also 
where the number of blacks were somehow limited.45 What developed was later to be 
called the "rule of exclusion" which protected defendants from the exclusion of minority 
jurors on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds.46 However, the rule of 
37 100 U.S. at 310. (The statute provided that "All white male persons who are twenty-one 
years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors .... "(quoting Acts of 
1872-73) Id. at 305.) 
38Id. at 310. 
39Id. at 308. 
4°Id. at 309. 
41 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880). 
42Id. (The Court stated, "The showing thus made, including as it did, the fact (so generally 
known that the court felt obliged to take judicial notice of it) that no colored citizen had ever been 
summoned as a juror in the courts of the State, -although its colored population exceeded twenty 
thousand in 1870, and in 1880 exceeded twenty-six thousand, in a total population of less than one 
hundred and fifty thousand- presented a prima facie case of denial, by the officers charged with the 
selection of grand and petit jurors of that equality of protection which has been secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States."). 
4S See Carter v. Tex., 177 U.S. 442 (1900) (Criminal defendant's right to equal protection was 
violated whenever state excluded members of that defendant's race from the jury no matter whether 
exclusion was accomplished by legislative, judiciary, or executive officers of the state.); Smith v. 
Tex., 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (Blacks were excluded from juries where commissioners did not chose 
blacks because they "did not know the names of any who were qualified" or because they were "not 
personally acquainted with them."). See also Cassell v. Tex., 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (Equal protection 
violation where only a limited number of blacks could be on a grand jury.); Norris v. Ala., 294 U.S. 
587 (1935) (Systematic and arbitrary exclusion of blacks from jury lists resulting in exclusion from 
grand and petit juries is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.). 
"See Neal v. Del., 103 U.S. at 397; Carter v. Tex., 177 U.S. at 448; Norris v. Ala., 294 U.S. at 
598. 
45 See Cassell v. Tex., 339 U.S. at 286-87; Avery v. Ga., 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (Court found 
purposeful discrimination where the state drew jurors from slips of paper on which names of white 
persons were on white slips and those of black persons were on yellow slips.). 
46 Hernandez v. Tex., 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954) (Constitutional protection from intentional 
exclusion not limited to blacks but applies to any identifiable group in the community which may 
be subject to prejudice.). See also Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (The elements of 
the rule of exclusion were: (1) the defendant must show membership in a "recognizable, distinct 
class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied" and (2)the 
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exclusion was limited in its application to eligibility for jury service, that is, eligibility for 
the jury venire. It did not prevent parties from utilizing subtle ways of keeping minorities 
off the petit jury. Thus, blacks continued to be excluded through the exercise of per-
emptory challenges. . 
The Supreme Court first reviewed the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
in Swain v. Alabama.47 In Swain, a black man was convicted of rape and sentenced to 
death.48 During the jury selection process, the prosecutor struck the only six eligible 
prospective black jurors from the venire resulting in an all-white jury.49 The defendant 
alleged a violation of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.5o 
The Court upheld the conviction despite the total exclusion of blacks from the jury 
because it did not want to place restrictions on the traditional use of peremptories.51 
The Court concluded that to subject the prosecutor's challenge to scrutiny in the case at 
hand would change the entire nature of the peremptory challenge, no longer making it 
peremptory. 52 Thus, by upholding the long standing tradition of peremptory challenges, 
the prosecutor's judgment in exercising challenges in a particular case was insulated 
from the court's interference. The Court stated that to show discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges the petitioner must show the systematic use of peremptories by 
a specific prosecutor over a period of time.5s Thus, in Swain, the Court found that the 
petitioner had failed to carry his burden of proof54 even though he had presented 
convincing evidence of jury discrimination in the county. The petitioner had shown that 
generally only ten to fifteen percent of the jury venires in criminal cases included an 
average of six or seven blacks and that no blacks had actually served on a petit jury in 
fifteen years in a county where black males over twenty-one constituted 26% of all 
males. 55 However, he had not shown that the opposing prosecutor had systematically 
excluded black jurors over a period of time.56 
IV. THE CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT 
The burden of proof set out in Swain to show discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges was later to prove insurmountable. 57 For the next twenty years almost all 
defendant must prove underrepresentation of the distinct classs on juries by "comparing the 
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as ... jurors, over 
a significant period of time." The Court explained the theory behind the "rule of exclusion" by 
stating that significant underrepresentation of a particular group is more likely explained by 
discriminatory selection procedures than by chance or by accident.). 
47 380 U.S. at 212-28. 
48 [d. at 203. 
49 Id. at 205. (There were eight blacks on the petit jury venire but none actully served, two 
being exempt and six being struck by the prosecutor.). 
~o [d. at 210. 
51 [d. at 221-22. 
52 [d. 
55 [d. at 227. 
54 [d. at 226. (Petitioner failed to show that the prosecutor was entirely responsible for the 
absence of black persons on petit jurors in the county. [d. at 224). 
~5 [d. at 205. 
~6 Id. at 224. 
57 There were only a handful of successful cases. See e.g., State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 
1979); State v. Washington; 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979). For a list of unsuccessful cases, see 79 
A.L.R.3D 14,56-73 (1977). 
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attempts in both state and federal courts were unsuccessful.5s There were several reasons 
for this remarkable lack of success. First, the Supreme Court had not clearly explained 
what it meant by systematic exclusion over a long period of time and had never set forth 
the precise elements of a prima facie case. 59 Second, an individual defendant most likely 
did not have the time or the resources to compile and analyze data necessary for a 
statistical attack on a particular prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges.6o Lastly, there 
was usually no information recorded about the racial identity of prospective jurors or 
on the prosecutor's use of strikes over a period of time.61 
Dissatisfied with the results, state courts eventually looked for an alternative test to 
show abuse of peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from juries. Instead of a 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, the state courts relied upon the requirement that a 
jury be drawn from a cross-section of the community, an idea which had been developed 
by the Supreme Court based on the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. In 
most cases the state courts overlooked the Swain precedent, based on the fact that at the 
time Swain was decided the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that the guarantee to an 
impartial jury in the Sixth Amendment was binding on the states by the incorporation 
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 
A. Supreme Court Development 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply the cross-section requirement to the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the Court has used the concept in other 
jury discrimination cases since the 1940's.63 The line of Supreme Court cases on point 
began with Smith v. Texas, where blacks were found to have been intentionally and 
systematically excluded from grand jury service.64 There, the Court first articulated the 
idea of cross-sectionalism. 
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of 
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. 
For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of 
otherwise qualified jurors not only violates our Constitution and the laws 
58 See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 286, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909 ("[I]n all of 
the cases involving this issue thus far, all of which have dealt with blacks as the group peremptorily 
challenged, no defendant has yet been successful in proving to the court's satisfaction an invidious 
discrimination by the use of the peremptory challenges against blacks over a period of time." 
(quoting Annot., Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude from Jury Persons Belonging to a Class of Race, 
79 A.L.R.3D 14,56-73 (1975)). 
59 United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1063 
(1984). 
6°Id. at 1317. 
61Id. 
62 See e.g., McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1122, (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted -U.S. _, 106 
S.Ct. 3289 (1986) Uudgments vacated and cases remanded for further consideration in light of 
Allen v. Hardy, _U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986), which held that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), is not to be applied retroactively to convictions that were final before Batson was decided. 
See infra note 98. 
63 For the history and theory behind the cross-section requirement, see V AN DYKE, supra note 
1, at 45-83. 
64 311 U.S. at 132. 
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enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society 
and a representative government. 65 
The Supreme Court continued to expand on this principle in several cases to follow. 
In Glasser v. United States, it reiterated the idea of a representative jury, noting that the 
impartiality achieved through representativeness is essential to the constitutional right 
to a jury trial.66 It further condemned the selection of juries by any means which did 
not comport with such goals.67 In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., the Court stated that the 
jury must be drawn from the community but it did not have to contain representatives 
of all the economic, social, racial, political, and geographical groups of the community 
since such complete representation would be impossible.68 Yet prospective jurors had to 
be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these 
groupS.69 
Subsequently, the Court extended the cross-section principle to permit any defen-
dant to challenge the arbitrary exclusion from the venire not only those of his own class 
but also those of different classes. In Peters v. Kif!, the Court reversed a state conviction 
of a white defendant upon a showing that blacks had been arbitrarily excluded from 
grand and petit jury service.70 The majority opinion rejected the State's argument that 
because the defendant was not himself black he was not harmed by the exclusion.7l The 
Court recognized that the exclusion of a discernible class from jury service not only 
harms defendants who belong to the excluded class but other defendants as well since 
it destroys the possibility that the jury will reflect a cross-section of the community.72 
Moreover, it concluded that to allow exclusion of a class of jurors merely on the as-
sumption that they will vote a certain way, may deprive the jury of perspectives which 
may have an unsuspected influence on the case.73 
Finally, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court imposed the cross-section rule on 
the states as a fundamental component of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.74 The Court stressed its ramifications 
on public policy grounds. 
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, 
is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but it is also critical to 
public confidence in the fairness of the criminal system. Restricting jury 
service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing 
651d. at 130. (footnote omitted). 
66 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942). 
671d. 
68 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (Federal court jury panel from which persons who worked for daily 
wages were intentionally and systematically excluded was held to be unlawfully constituted.). 
691d. 
70 407 U.S. 493, 505 (1972). 
7l ld. at 498. 
721d. at 500. 
731d. at 503-04. 
74 419 U.S. 522, 530, 538 (1975) (Requirement that a petit jury selected from a representative 
cross-section of the community as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was violated by the system-
atic exclusion of women from jury panels, which in the judicial district involved amounted to 53% 
of the citizens eligible for jury service.). 
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major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional 
concept of jury trial .... 75 
B. State Application to Peremptory Challenges 
111 
As an alternative to Swain, the states applied this newly developed principal under 
their state constitutions to prevent the use of peremptory challenges to systematically 
remove minority jurors.76 The California Supreme Court was the first to do so in People 
v. Wheeler in which two defendants, both black, were accused of murdering a white man 
during a robbery.77 At trial, a number of blacks were called to the jury box, were 
questioned on voir dire, and were passed for cause.78 The prosecutor proceeded to strike 
every black person from the jury panel using his peremptory challenges.79 In the end, 
an all-white jury convicted the defendants.8o The Court found that this use of peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violated the 
right to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community.8! 
The Court explained that a party is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near 
an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random 
draw permits.82 
The Wheeler Court established a feasible burden of proof as compared to that set 
forth in Swain. Thus, if a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges 
to strike jurors on the grounds of group bias alone, he must raise the point in a timely 
fashion while making as complete a record of the circumstances as possible.S! He must 
then establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the 
meaning of the representative cross-section rule.s4 Lastly, he must show a strong likeli-
hood that such persons are being systematically excluded because of their group asso-
ciation rather than because of any specific bias.85 The court must then determine whether 
a reasonable inference arises that the peremptory challenges are being used on the 
ground of group bias alone.s6 If the court finds that such is shown, the burden shifts to 
the other party to show, if he can, that the peremptory challenges in question were not 
75Id. at 530. 
76 See generally Duncan v. La., 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
impose upon the states a duty to give a trial by jury in any criminal case.). 
7722 Cal. 3d at 262, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
78/d. at 262-63, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
79Id. at 263, 583 P.2d at 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 893. 
80 Id. 
81Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The court's decision was based on an 
interpretation of the California Constitution, Article I, Section 16 which states "Trial by jury is an 
inviolate right and shall be secured to all .... " Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895. 
82Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. 
8S Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
84 Id. 
85Id. See also People v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 606, 704 P.2d 176, 181-82,217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 
422 (1985) (In determining whether a cognizable group has been discriminatorily excluded from 
jury, the question is not one of merits of one group in contrast to another; the basis for prohibition 
from excluding cognizable groups is the diversity in beliefs and values that jurors bring from their 
group experiences which must be encouraged in order to achieve overall impartiality in decision 
making processes. (citing Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 276, 583 P.2d at 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 583). 
86 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
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predicated on group bias alone.87 Moreover, the showing need not rise to the level of a 
challenge for cause88 but must merely show that his actions were reasonably relevant to 
the circumstances surrounding the case.89 
If the court finds that the burden of justification is not sustained, the presumption 
of validity in favor of the challenged party's use of peremptory challenges is thereby 
rebutted.90 Accordingly, the court must find that the jury as constituted fails to comply 
with the cross-section requirement, a mistrial must be declared, and jury selection must 
begin anew.91 
Soon after Wheeler, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled similarly in 
Commonwealth v. Soares.92 In Soares, three black defendants were convicted of murdering 
a white Harvard football player in Boston.93 At trial, the prosecutor peremptorily chal-
lenged twelve of the thirteen eligible black jurors.94 In all, he excluded 92% of the 
available black jurors and only 34% of the available white jurors.95 The Court concluded 
that the jury as constituted failed to comply with the representative cross-section require-
ment under article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution 
and remanded the case for a new trial. 96 
A line of state cases continued to recognize the Wheeler-Soares rationale.97 In addition 
two federal cases adopted the same view under the Sixth Amendment.98 The issue was 
again presented before the Supreme Court in McCray v. New York but the Court denied 
87Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (footnote omitted). The term "group 
bias" refered to a condition where "a party presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because 
they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar 
grounds." Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902 .. 
88Id. at 282, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
89Id. 
90 Id. 
91Id. For a list of cases in which defendants have successfully established a prima facie case 
under the Wheeler standard, see Note, Batson v. Kentucky: Jury Discrimination and the Peremptory 
Challenge for Cause, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 221, 232 n.103 (1986). 
92 377 Mass at 488, 491, 387 N.E.2d at 516,517-18. 
93Id. at·463-64, 387 N.E.2d at 502. 
94 Id. at 473,387 N.E.2d at 508. 
95Id. 
96 Id. at 488,387 N.E.2d at 516. 
Art. 12 provides in pertinent part, "And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, 
or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of law, exiled, or 
deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgments of his peers or the law of the land." 
MA. CONST. art. XII. 
97 See State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 481; State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508,511 A.2d 1150 (1986); 
Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Riley v. Del., _V.S. _,106 S.Ct. 3339;; 
People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1981); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 
(Colo. 1987). See also State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (Court 
would recognize discriminatory use of peremptory challenges under Wheeler-Soares rationale as 
supported by Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution, if the proper case arose.). 
98 McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d at 1113. (Exclusion of all black and hispanic jurors from a 
criminal jury through prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.); Booker v. jabe, 775 F.2d at 772 (All-white jury resulted when prosecutor used 22 
of his 26 peremptory challenges to exclude black potential jurors, in several instances without 
addressing any questions to the excused jurors. On the other hand, the two black defendants used 
all forty of their combined peremptory challenges and excused 37 white potential jurors. Id. at 
764.). 
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certiorari.99 Although it recognized the importance of the problem,lOo the Court did not 
reexamine the issue but instead wanted the state courts to refine it further. 101 
V. SUPREME COURT LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
A. Batson v. Kentucky: Limiting the Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges 
Finally in 1986, over two decades after Swain, the Supreme Court once again 
reviewed the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,102 In 
Batson, a black man was convicted of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen 
goods,lo3 At trial, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all four black 
persons resulting in an all-white jury. 1M The defense counsel moved to discharge the 
jury on the grounds that prosecutor's removal of black venireman violated defendant's 
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to ajury drawn from a cross-section 
of the community and to equal protection of the law. 105 The trial judge denied the 
motion and the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, declining to adopt a Wheeler-
Soares rationale. 106 
However, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 107 Although it did not rec-
ognize the defendant's Sixth Amendment c1aim,lOs it held that Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race 
or on the assumption that black jurors will be unable to impartially consider the State's 
case against a black defendant. 109 Moreover, the Court abandoned the Swain burden and 
adopted a more flexible rule which relied solely on the facts of the particular case rather 
than over a period of time. I 10 To establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, 
the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the 
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of 
the defendant's race, and that the facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an 
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit 
jury on account of their race,lll Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the 
burden shifts to the prosecutor who must then articulate a neutral explanation related 
to the particular case. ll2 The court must then make the final determination. ll3 The 
Supreme Court concluded that their decision did not undermine the tradition of per-
99 461 U.S. 961 (1983). 
100Id. at 961-62. 
101 Id. at 962-63. 
102 476 U.S. at 79. 
103Id. at 82. 
104 Id. at 83. 
105Id. 
106 Id. at 83-84. 
107Id. at 100. 
108Id. at 89 n.12. ("We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on the 
exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense counsel."). 
109 Id. at 86. 
II°Id. at 95. 
III Id. at 96. 
112 Id. at 97. 
113 Id. at 98. 
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emptory challenges but rather furthered the ends of justice by not allowing citizens to 
be excluded from jury service because of their race}14 
B. Limiting the Defense's Use of Peremptory Challenges 
The importance of Batson lies in the fact that it recognized the abuse of peremptory 
challenges. I 15 Moreover, it set forth a more practical approach to prove a prima facie case 
of discrimination thereby overruling the insurmountable burden of proof as established 
in Swain. ll6 However, the holding was actually limited in its scope. Although it restricted 
the prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, it did not express a view 
on the Sixth Amendment argumentll7 nor did it extend protection to other cognizable 
groups other than racial groups.llS Moreover, it did not extend the ruling to include the 
defense's use of peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from the jury.llg 
While the Supreme Court has remained silent on this last issue, some state courts 
and lower federal courts have addressed this issue under the cross-section analysis. Both 
the Wheeler and Soares courts, in prohibiting the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges by the prosecution under Sixth Amendment type analysis, extended their 
holdings, in dicta, to limit the exercise of peremptory challenges by the defense coun-
sel.J20 In Wheeler, the California Supreme Court, predicting a Howard Beach situation, 
noted that the government is also entitled to a trial by an impartial jury: 
[T]he People no less than individual defendants are entitled to a trial by an 
impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. 
Furthermore, to hold to the contrary would frustrate cross-sectional-
ism ... For example, when a defendant is charged with a crime against a black 
victim the community as a whole has a legitimate interest in participating in 
the trial proceeding; that interest will be defeated if the prosecutor does not 
have the power to thwart any defense attempt to strike all blacks from the 
jury on the ground of group bias alone. 121 
114Id. at 98-99. 
For an in-depth discussion of the Batson decision, see e.g., Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments-
The Swain Song of the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
821, 829-34 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments]; Note, Batson v. Kentucky: 
Jury Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge for Cause, 20 CREIGHTON L. REv. 221 (1986); Note, 
The Death Knell of the Insurmountable Burden: Batson v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 473 (1987) 
[hereinafter Note, The Death Knell]. 
115 476 U.S. at 99. 
116 See id. at 96-98. 
1I7Id. at 84 n.4. For further discussion of the Sixth Amendment as applied to the prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges, see Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?- Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, 
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501 (1986); Comment, ImpartialJury Guarantees of State May 
Forbid the Use of Peremptory Challenges Exercised to Exclude Jurors Solely Because of Race, 16 U. TOL. L. 
REv. 507 (1985); Doyel, In Search of a Remedy for the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 
38 OKLA. L. REV. 385 (1985); Wilson, Prosecutorial Misuse of Peremptory Challenges and the Sixth 
Amendment, 29 How. L.J. 481 (1986); Comment, Skin Color Doesn't Reason: Closing the Door on the 
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenge, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 171 (1986). 
118 See 476 U.S. at 99. 
1I9Id. at 89 n.12; see infra note 108. 
120 People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d. at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907 n.29; 
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. at 489 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35. 
12122 Cal. 3d at 282 n.29, 583 P.2d at 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907 n.29. 
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Moreover, the Wheeler court's intentions were clearly reflected in the fact that its holding 
was written in neutral language which could be applied to either the defense or the 
prosecution. 122 
Several California cases have subsequently upheld the Wheeler mandate. In People v. 
Pagel, the Superior Court explicitly ruled on this issue.123 The defendant, charged of a 
hit and run resulting in injury,I24 was white and both the victim and the People's witnesses 
were all black.125 The defense counsel proceeded to exercise his first three peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors each of whom were black. 126 The trial court 
held that the People had made a prima facie case showing that the defendant had utilized 
peremptory challenges systematically on the basis of group bias and that the defense's 
explanations to overcome the burden were insufficient.127 Consequently, the Court dis-
missed the jury members already selected, quashed the remaining venire, and started 
jury selection anew. 128 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and out-
rightly rejected the defendant's argument that restrictions of peremptory challenges only 
applied to the prosecution.129 Furthermore, in Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., the Court 
went even further and extended the Wheeler mandate to both parties in civil trials. uo 
In Massachussetts, the Soares court had also extended its ruling to include the use 
of peremptories by the defense.l3l Similar to the Wheeler decision, it stated: 
While we have highlighted a defendant's right to be protected from the 
improper use of peremptory challenges, we recognize the Commonwealth's 
interest in prosecutions that are 'tried before the tribunal which the Consti-
tution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.' Singer v. United States, 
380 u.S. 24, 36 (1965). For this reason we deem the Commonwealth equally 
to be entitled to a representative jury unimpaired by improper exercise of 
peremptory challenges by the defense. Such a rule also serves to protect 
minority groups in the community .... 152 
The Soares mandate was later upheld in Commonwealth v. Reid, where the defendant was 
prohibited from using her peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely on the basis 
of group association. us 
122 The Court used generic language such as "the party" and "the opposing party" rather than 
specifying "the prosecution" and "the defense." See id. at 280-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. at 905-06. 
128 186 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 232 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1986). 
124Id. at 3, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 104. 
125Id. at 4, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 105. 
126Id. at 3, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 105. 
127Id at 4-5, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06. 
128Id. at 5-6, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 106. 
129Id. at 6-7, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 107. 
180 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 592-93, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (1983) (Defense was found to have 
improperly exercised its peremptory challenges where it peremptorily excused three of four black 
jurors and then excused the fourth for cause.). 
181 377 Mass. at 489 n.35, 387 N.E.2d at 517 n.35. 
182/d. 
188 384 Mass. 247, 251-56, 424 N.E.2d 495, 498-501 (1981) (Counsel for female defendant 
who had admitted killing male victim peremptorily excused all six males on the jury panel. Id. at 
251,424 N.E.2d 498.). 
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In Florida, the court in State v. Neil agreed with the Wheeler-Soares mandate. 13• It 
too found that both the State and the defense may challenge the allegedly improper use 
of peremptories "since the State, no less than a defendant is entitled to an impartial 
jury."U5 
Among the federal courts, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Booker v. Jabe, has 
been the first to recognize limitations on the use of the defense's peremptory chal-
lenges. u6 Under a Sixth Amendment analysis, the court stated: 
Although the Sixth Amendment by its terms protects the right of "the 
accused" to trial by an impartial jury, it does not guarantee a criminal defen-
dant the right to trial before a jury that is partial to his cause. The spectacle 
of a defense counsel systematically excusing potential jurors because of their 
race or other shared group identity while the prosecutor and trial judge 
were constrained merely to observe, could only impair the public's confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the resulting jury. Therefore, we hold 
that under the Sixth Amendment, neither prosecutor nor defense counsel 
may systematically exercise peremptory challenges to excuse members of a 
cognizable group from service on a criminal petit jury. 157 
If the Supreme Court is to place restrictions on the defense's use of peremptory 
challenges, it must do so under the cross-section requirement as state and lower federal 
courts have done. u8 An equal protection analysis, which the court applied to the pros-
ecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Batson, cannot simply be ex-
tended to protect the State.139 While the defenda.nt is protected against discriminatory 
state action, the reverse is not true. 140 Since the defense's conduct does not constitute 
state action, the State is not protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 141 
.3·457 So. 2d at 487. At oral argument even defense counsel agreed that any new test should 
apply to both sides. [d. at n.ll. 
155 [d. at 487. See also City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(A new trial was granted to the plaintiff in a civil case after the defense counsel had exercised all 
of ite peremptory challenges against blacks thereby insuring an all-white jury.) . 
• 36 775 F.2d at 772. An open batde of peremptory challenges between the prosecutor and 
defense counsel had erupted at trial, see supra note 98. 
157 [d. 
158 See Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, supra note 114, at 839. 
159 See id. at 838 . 
• 40 See id. 
'4' See Civil Rights Cases, 109 u.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Equal protection applies only to state action, 
not private action.). 
Even when a defense counsel is a public defender employed by the state, he does not act 
"under color of state law." See Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, supra note 114, at 838 (citing 
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981». 
While a private defense attorney's actions do not constitute state action, if a judge acquiesces 
to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, his acquiescence enables this private discrimi-
nation to exist. This judicial enforcement could possibly constitute state action and be subject to 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (Affirmative judicial 
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants against blacks in deeds of residential property consti-
tuted state action and thus, a denial of equal protection.). 
Most likely though, no discriminatory state action will be found where the court applies 
"neutral" laws. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,445 (1975) (Ruling by a Georgia Supreme Court 
to terminate a trust did nQt constitute discriminatory state action since the court was merely 
interpreting a racially restrictive will made by a private party. There was no discriminatory intent 
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Thus, a Sixth Amendment analysis, whereby an "impartial" jury will be ensured, is 
essential. 142 
The Supreme Court should adopt a Sixth Amendment analysis to limit the defense's 
use of peremptory challenges for several reasons. By not extending restrictions to the 
defense, the composition of the jury will be lopsided in favor of the defendant. 14! While 
the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges will be restricted, the defense's use will 
remain unchecked. This result will certainly contravene the goals of the Sixth Amend-
ment, since the jury will no longer be "impartial." A long line of Supreme Court cases, 
beginning with Smith v. Texas, has upheld the principle that "the jury be a body truly 
representative of the community."144 To continue to allow the racially discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges by the defense would be contrary to this ideal and those of 
our democratic society. While a defendant is guaranteed an "impartial" jury by the 
Constitution, there is nothing that says a defendant is entitled to a jury that is biased in 
favor of him.145 Moreover, if the defendant is acquitted as a result of a "partial" jury, 
the prosecution has no chance to appeal. 146 
The State too is entitled to an "impartial " jury. 147 While the Constitution does not 
explicitly protect the State, the Supreme Court has recognized the Government's interest 
in criminal trials. It has noted: 
[T]he Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of 
determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest 
in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried 
before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce 
a fair result. 148 
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hayes v. Missouri recognized the prosecution's interest 
in the exercise of peremptory challenges in order to secure "impartiality."149 It stated, 
"It is to be remembered that such impartiality requires not only freedom from any bias 
against the accused, but also from any prejudice against the prosecution."15o 
on the part of the state.). "Encouragement" of discrimination will however trigger a constitutional 
violation. See Reitman v, Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76. See generally Note, The Death Knell, supra 
note 114, at 505-06 n.220. 
142 See Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, supra note 114, at 839. 
145 See infra note 155 
144 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. 
145 See Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d at 772. 
146 Provisions governing appeals by the prosecution vary among jurisdictions. In a few states, 
the prosecution is denied any right to appeal. Some states allow the prosecution to appeal an 
allegedly erroneous "ruling of law." including a trial ruling, even after the jury has returned a 
verdict. Most states, however limit prosecution appeals to (1) pretrial appeals from decisions dis-
missing an indictment or information (and in some states, a complaint), and (2) post verdict appeals 
from decisons granting a new trial or motion in arrest of judgment. Y. KASIMAR, W. LAFAVE, J. 
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1974). 
147 See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 596, (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 976 
(1979) (The right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury guaranteed a criminally accused under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is also enjoyed by the State); Williams v. Wainwright, 427 F.2d 
921, 923 (5th Cir. 1970) (The state also enjoys the right to any impartial jury.). 
14S Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). 
149 120 U.S. 68, 70-72 (1887). 
150 [d. at 70. 
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Even the Swain Court stated that "[b]etween [the defendant] and the State the scales 
are to be evenly held."lsl Since the State is entitled to no less than the defendant, it is 
only fair and rational that the adversary system should be an equally balanced process: 
what applies to one party, should apply to the other. 
Moreover, the right to peremptory challenges is not guaranteed to a defendant by 
the Constitution. It is merely a statutory right. 15. In addition, when a statutory procedure 
is found to conflict with a constitutional right, the constituional right preempts it.i53 
Thus, if peremptory challenges are exercised by the defense in such a way that it 
contravenes the constitutional right to an impartial jury, the Court cannot allow it. 
From a policy standpoint, the failure to restrict the defendant's use of peremptory 
challenges while the prosecution's use is so restricted will undermine public confidence 
in the judicial system. The jury, the backbone of our democratic system, will no longer 
be fair and impartial. The jury's decision will no longer be perceived as being credible 
and trustworthy or as a reflection of the community's conscience. 
To continue to allow people to be excluded from juries solely on the basis of race 
affects the rights of those who are excluded for such reasons. As early as 1880, the 
Supreme Court in Strauder recognized the dangers inherent in this.ls, The exclusion of 
otherwise qualified persons from the jury creates a feeling not only of unfairness and 
dissatisfaction but of inferiority. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should follow the lead of state and lower federal courts, as it 
did in limiting the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges, and limit the defendant's 
use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from juries under a Sixth 
Amendment analysis. This abusive practice by the defense currently exists unchecked 
especially when the defendants are white and the victims black. In fact, the Carter Justice 
Department testified that manipulation of juries by the defense is a growing phenome-
non. ISS Today, after so many years of trying to eradicate racial discrimination in our 
society, such a practice should not be allowed to pervade our jury selection process. 
151 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Mo., 120 U.S. at 70.) 
152 See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) ("There is nothing in the Constitution 
of the United States which requires Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in 
criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured."). 
1.3 See People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (1982) rev'd on other 
grounds, 457 N.E.2d 1202 (Ill. 1983) ("When a constitutional right conflicts with a statutory proce-
dure, the constitutional right must prevail." (Citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 224, Goldberg,]., dissenting) 
("Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, settled beyond doubt that when a constitutional claim is 
opposed by a nonconstitutional one, the former must prevail.")). 
15. See supra notes 6 & 37-40 and accompanying text. 
155 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearings Before the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 72-73 (1977) (Statement of Richard L. Thornburgh, acting 
Deputy Attorney General). 
Mr. Thornburgh testified in support of a proposed amendment to the Fed. R. of Crim. P. to 
reduce and equalize the number of peremptory challenges between the government and the 
defense. He pointed out the growing phenomenon among defendants involved with political 
corruption or white collar offenses to commission sociological studies and opinion polls to determine 
the attitudes of particular segments of the community in which their trial is being held. Such studies 
along with the judicious exercise of peremptory challenges have been permitted moneyed defen-
dants to shape the jury and augment the chances of a favorable verdict. 
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Neither the defense nor the prosecution should be allowed to continue this abusive 
practice. The ramifications of this practice far outweigh any interest in upholding the 
use of peremptories merely on the basis of tradition. The use of peremptories seems to 
have outgrown its original intentions. 
However, limiting the use of peremptory challenges by either party leaves the future 
of peremptories in question. Originally, peremptories were considered to be challenges 
for which no reason need be given. Ideally the purpose was to eliminate extreme bias 
on each side which might be difficult to explain. The original purpose has since become 
distorted, as it has become commonplace practice to exclude jurors simply on the basis 
of race on the assumption that black jurors will be sympathetic to black defendants or 
that they will be unsympathetic to white defendants. To eradicate this practice, the courts 
have thus had to subject peremptory challenges to scrutiny. Now, in order to overcome 
a prima facie case of discrimination against him, a party must offer a "neutral" explanation 
sufficient to the court. If the explanation is insufficient or if no explanation is given at 
all, the court will rule against him and order jury selection to begin anew. Hence, the 
peremptory challenge is no longer insulated from the court's discretion as it was originally 
intended to be. The principal on which it was has been based has certainly been greatly 
eroded. 
Some commentators have suggested that peremptories be abolished altogether. 156 
Others have suggested reducing the number of peremptories so as to lessen any possible 
discriminatory impact. 157 Still others have suggested the use of "negative" peremptory 
challenges as a type of affirmative jury selection to ensure representation. 158 Such per-
emptory "holds" would give counsel the privilege of selecting those most likely to favor 
their party as opposed to "striking" jurors least likely to sympathize with their cause. 159 
In any case, the tradition of peremptories is no longer a sufficient justification for 
allowing them to continue to be used in a racially discriminatory manner. Our country 
has long strived to eradicate racial discrimination in any form. The last place it should 
pervade is in our judicial system. To fully resolve the issue of racially discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court should extend restrictions to the defense. 
Perhaps, thereafter, the entire use of peremptory challenges should be reevaluated by 
our courts and Congress keeping in mind the goals of our jury system, that is, to provide 
a fair and impartial trial. 
BEVERLY A. CHIN 
156 See Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
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